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Spain was expecting its EU presidency of the EU Council to be a more 
pleasant  experience.  Looking  back,  these  six  months  were  totally 
dominated by the economic  crisis, which  put  an  abrupt end to  a long 
boom  period.  The  Spanish  were  baffled  by  the  way  that  the  actual 
problems were hyped up by the European media. One thing is certain: 25 
years after it joined the European Community, the country faces major 
challenges – economical, political and social. 
 
In a state ceremony held on 12 June 2010, 
Spain and Portugal celebrated the signing 
of  the  accession  agreements  to  the 
European  Economic  Community  25  years 
ago. Accession to the European Economic 
Community  was  not  only  of  symbolic 
importance  to  the  two  countries,  which 
were still young democracies at the time. 
The  political  and  economic  balance  sheet 
on membership has been very positive for 
both countries. And, conversely, it is also 
true  that  especially  Spain  has  played  an 
active  role  in  European  debates  over  the 
past decades, strengthening the process of 
integration in a positive way.  
 
Nevertheless  Spain  is  currently  looking 
askance  at  Europe  and  Europe  at  Spain. 
The  celebrations  on  12  June  are  also 
symbolic here: the Spanish and Portuguese 
celebrated  by  themselves.  Solely  the 
President  of  the  European  Parliament, 
Jerzy  Buzek,  undertook  the  journey  to 
Lisbon  –  otherwise  nobody  came  from 
Brussels, Berlin, Paris or London. What is 
worse – the other European countries did 
not  even  notice  this  historical  date. 
Instead,  the  European  media  –  with  the 
German media leading the way – indulged 
in  crisis  scenarios:  the  government  in 
Madrid  was  said  to  be  on  the  brink  of 
bankruptcy and would have to make use of 
the  rescue  package  for  ailing  Euro  states 
in the near future. 
 
For  the  media  it  makes  sense  to  cover 
Spain  together  with  Greece  and  other 
“southern European states”, thus creating 
a  self-fulfilling  prophecy  in  the  current 
situation:  the  hysteria  of  the  markets  is  
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whipped up anew with every new report in 
the media and, along with it, the costs of 
refinancing the government deficit as well 
as mistrust in the banks of the respective 
country. Nor does there appear to be room 
for anything else: the Spanish Presidency 
of  the  EU  Council,  which  ended  in  June, 
has  been  long  forgotten  as  a  topic  of 
debate outside Spain. 
 
There  is  no  question  that  Spain  is  in  a 
deep  economic  and  political  crisis.  The 
crisis  is  not  a  purely  Spanish  one, 
however.  It  also  exposes  a  flaw  in  the 
process  of  European  integration  and 
threatens  relations  between  Spain  and 
Europe.  A  farewell  to  illusions  and 
energetic reforms are the order of the day 
– but not only in Spain.  
 
 
 
I 
The first illusion: 
coherence is not a 
“freebie” 
One of the core ideas underlying European 
integration  is  still  to  approximate 
economic power and thus living conditions 
in the member states as well. The illusion 
that  this  heterogeneity  would  evaporate 
with the common market and the common 
currency  has  been  shattered  by  the 
example of Spain. 
 
The  Spanish  economic  boom  was  a  boom 
on credit. Compared to the rest of Europe, 
the  interest  rates  of  the 
European  Central  Bank  were 
too  low  for  the  uncompetitive 
economy of the country, which 
was  oriented  towards  the 
domestic market. Its accession 
to  the  Monetary  Union 
unleashed  a  boom  in 
consumption  and  the  building 
industry unlike the country or 
the  continent  had  ever  seen 
before. In some years up until 
2007  more  residential  units 
were  built  in  Spain  than  in 
Germany, France and Italy put 
together.  The  high  rate  of 
migration to Spain – according 
to  unofficial  estimates  around 
5  million  persons  have 
immigrated  into  Spain  since 
1999  –  and  the  wave  of 
northern  and  central 
Europeans  purchasing  second 
dwellings on the Spanish coast 
only explain this development 
in part. The fact of the matter 
is  that  many  Spaniards  and 
institutional investors allowed 
themselves  to  be  enticed  into 
speculating in real estate as a 
result of low interest rates and 
rising  real  estate  prices.  Financing 
packages offered 
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by  local  savings  and  loans  made  it 
attractive  to  purchase  real  estate  for 
people with low income as well.  
 
Growth  rates  averaging  3%  made  Spain 
one of the most attractive countries in the 
EU  for  investors.  Prosperity  grew 
perceptively and export-oriented European 
partners – with Germany at the top of the 
list  –  rejoiced  over  what  seemed  to  be  a 
never-ending  upward  spiral  in  exports  to 
Spain.  The  dangers  of  this  growth  on 
credit  either  were  not  seen  or  they  were 
played down. 
The real estate bubble burst with the onset 
of  the  international  financial  crisis.  The 
building  sector,  which  in  2007  still 
contributed 7% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP),  collapsed.  Real  estate  prices  have 
been  plummeting  ever  since,  while 
unemployment is soaring to record levels: 
in  the  second  quarter  of  2010  the 
unemployment rate hit 20%. Among young 
adults it has even reached 40%. Half of all 
jobs  in  the  building  sector  have  been 
eliminated.  As  a  result  of  the  high 
unemployment,  consumption  has  also 
taken  a  nosedive,  dropping  6%  in  2009 
alone. 
 
Since  then  Spain  has  been  mired  in  a 
recession. A 0.4% decline in GDP is being 
forecasted for 2010 as well. Spain is only 
expected  to  grow  moderately  again  in 
2011  –  the  last  big  national  economy  in 
the Euro zone to return to the growth path. 
For  the  government  budget,  this  means 
dwindling  tax  revenue  and  considerably 
greater  outlays.  The  government  took  in 
15% less tax revenue in 2009 than in the 
previous year. In addition to expenditures 
on  unemployment  benefits,  increased 
government spending was also channelled 
into  the  economic  stimulus  package,  as 
almost all European countries did in 2008 
and  2009  in  order  to  prevent  a  complete 
economic  meltdown.  As  a  result,  the 
Spanish  budget  deficit  jumped  from  4.1% 
of GDP in 2008 to 11.2% in 2009. 
 
Spain has benefited from the fact that all 
its  governments  kept  a  tight  lid  on 
budgets  until  the  outbreak  of  the  crisis. 
During the growth years budget surpluses 
of  up  to  2%  of  GDP  were  registered. 
Politicians resisted the temptation to bloat 
the  state  apparatus.  The  percentage  of 
economic output accounted for by the state 
was reduced to 39% in 2007, which is low  
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by  European  comparison  (Germany  43%, 
France 52%). This explains why the debt-
to-economic-power  ratio,  which  was  53% 
even in 2010, is still below the EU average 
and  far  below  that  of  Germany  (73%)  or 
France (78%). 
Another  bright  spot  in  the  Spanish 
economy  often  goes  unmentioned  in  the 
current  debate.  Strong  multinational 
enterprises  have  been  established  in 
Spain.  Forbes  magazine  ranks  three 
Spanish  enterprises  (and  two  German 
ones) among the 40 biggest global players. 
The  big  Spanish  banks  Santander  and 
BBVA  and  the  formerly  state-owned 
telecommunications  company  Telefónica 
have  left  the  European  competition  far 
behind  and  ensure  that  Spain  will 
participate  in  the  recovery  of  the  world 
economy.  They  are  especially  active  in 
the growth markets of Latin America. 
 
Thanks  to  the  Spanish  financial 
supervisory authorities, which prohibited 
speculation  with  American  bonds  and 
forced  banks  to  make  high  anti-cyclical 
provisions  during  the  boom,  the  major 
Spanish  private  banks  have  made  it 
through  the  financial  crisis  in  far  better 
shape than their European competitors. 
 
The picture looks different with the more 
than fifty savings and loan banks which 
are  suffering  from  burgeoning  write-
downs on domestic real estate loans. The 
central bank has already forced the first 
savings and loans to merge. In contrast to 
Germany,  it  has  not  been  necessary  to 
use  the  rescue-package  millions  to  date. 
Articles in the German press stating that 
the Spanish banking industry was on the 
verge  of  collapse  have  turned  out  to  be 
groundless, but nevertheless managed to 
have  a  pernicious  effect  on  the  issue  of 
Spanish treasury bonds in the middle of 
June. Not only the government in Madrid 
and  the  European  Commission  but  also 
members  of  the  German  government 
expressly  stated  that  the  reports  were 
false. In order to restore confidence in the 
stability of the Spanish  banking  system, 
the  Spanish  government  prevailed  in  its 
efforts  to  have  stress  tests  on  European 
banks published in the future at the final 
summit in its presidency of the EU Council 
on 17 June. 
  
II 
Reform: between saving 
and growth 
The economic boom in countries like Spain 
and Ireland, which went hand in hand with 
the monetary union, gave rise to the hope 
that  the  economic  differences  within  the 
Euro zone would fade away on their own. 
At the end of the boom, the differences in  
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the  macro  economies  of  the  Euro  zone 
appear more pronounced than ever. Ailing 
macro economies are more vulnerable than 
before.  Painful  reforms  to  the  Spanish 
economic model are just as necessary as is 
a  fundamental  overhaul  of  the  European 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
 
In  terms  of  economic  and  regulatory 
policy,  Spain  is  being  forced  into  a 
balancing  act:  on  the  one  hand  the 
government  deficit  has  to  be  radically 
reduced.  The  goal  stated  by  the 
government  of  José  Luis  Rodríguez 
Zapatero is to cut the budget deficit to 3% 
and thus return to the level set out in the 
Stability  and  Growth  Pact.  Already  in 
January  2010  the  Socialist  government 
submitted  an  austerity  programme 
containing EUR 50 billion in cut-backs. An 
additional austerity programme was added 
to this in May, providing for another EUR 
15 billion in belt-tightening measures. The 
European  Commission  and  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  have  voiced 
their support for the strategy. 
 
It  is  as  yet  unclear,  however,  how  new 
growth is to come about. The weak links in 
the  Spanish  economy  continue  to  be  its 
low  levels  of  productivity  and 
competitiveness.  The  Spanish  labour 
market is ailing under a two-fold problem: 
an  inflexible  section  made  up  of  workers 
with long-term employment contracts, who 
it  is  practically  impossible  to  make 
redundant,  and  a  virtually  unregulated 
sector  in  which  employees  have  to  grope 
from one temporary contract to the next. 
 
Following fruitless negotiations with social 
partners  in  the  middle  of  June,  the 
Socialist government has submitted a draft 
bill aimed at reforming the labour market. 
Whether the minority government will be 
successful  in  pushing  the  law  through 
Parliament  or  not  is  uncertain.  The 
conservative People’s Party is not budging 
from its obstructionist attitude. The small 
party of Catalan Christian Democrats could 
help  the  government  obtain  the  needed 
majority, as was already the case with the 
small  package  of  austerity  measures 
adopted in May. 
 
But  there  is  more  at  stake  than  just  a 
reform of the labour market. Spain has to 
generate  growth  in  completely  new 
sectors.  Education  and  research  are  the 
top  priorities  here.  The  Spanish 
educational  system  has  been  suffering 
from  sluggish  progress  in  reforms  for 
some  time  now.  30%  of  all  young  people 
drop  out  of  school  prematurely.  The 
OECD’s  PISA  studies  show  that  the 
Spanish  school  system  is  inefficient 
compared  to  other  European  countries. 
Vocational  education  has  also  been 
neglected.  Investment  in  research  and 
development  continues  to  lag  behind  the 
European  average.  The  Spanish 
government  needs  to  do  no  less  than 
reinvent the entire national growth model.  
 
But  Europe  must  also  bid  farewell  to  the 
illusion that coherence can be obtained for 
free. A common currency and central bank 
alone  are  too  weak  to  reduce  the 
heterogeneity  of  national  economies.  On 
the contrary: Spain and Ireland show that 
asymmetrical  shocks  even  exacerbate 
differences in development. The first steps 
taken  in  the  direction  of  a  tighter 
coordination  of  economic  policy,  as  were 
decided  by  the  heads  of  government  on 
June  17,  point  in  the  right  direction. 
Whether these will suffice to put different 
national  economies  on  a  common, 
sustainable  growth  footing  remains  to  be 
seen.  If  the  task  at  hand  is  to  limit  the 
development  of  dangerous  long-term 
imbalances in competitiveness and current 
accounts, then there must be no taboos in 
the future. 
 
III 
The second illusion: 
democracy means 
confrontation 
The  Spanish  democracy  has  proven  to  be 
extremely  durable  in  its  thirty  years‘  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
#
 
2
0
1
0
/
0
6
 
S
p
a
i
n
 
a
n
d
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
l
l
u
s
i
o
n
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
a
g
e
p
a
g
e
p
a
g
e
p
a
g
e
 
6
 
history.  Spanish  society  has  surmounted 
major  challenges  with  relative  ease, 
exhibiting  a  remarkable  openness  to 
change – from separatist terrorism to the 
Islamic attacks in 2004 all the way to the 
dizzying  transformation  from  a  country 
with a net emigration balance to one with 
a net immigration balance. 
 
These  fundamental  characteristics  appear 
to be leading Spanish society through the 
current crisis as well. Thus far, neither the 
ever  more  tangible  effects 
of the crisis nor the reform 
efforts  of  the  government 
have  unleashed  spasms  of 
outrage and violence like in 
Greece. The social partners 
are  sticking  to  familiar 
forms  of  politics.  There  is 
no  trace  of  hysteria.  An 
initial  strike  called  by 
public  workers  against  the 
government’s  second 
package  of  austerity 
measures  only  met  with 
luke-warm support from the 
rank  and  file.  The  trade 
unions are only planning to 
cross  swords  with  the 
Socialist  government  in 
September,  when  it  is  due 
to  submit  the  budget  for 
2011 to the Parliament. 
 
But current results of surveys give rise for 
concern  over  the  state  of  democracy  in 
Spain.  The  stable  two-party  system  – 
which is only fragmented on the edges by 
nationalist  parties  from  the  Basque 
country, Catalonia and other regions – has 
revealed a defect in the crisis whose long-
term  impact  cannot  be  predicted.  For 
decades  now  the  two  leading  parties,  the 
Socialist  PSOE  and  the  conservative 
People’s Party (PP), have been locked in a 
debate of mutual negation, with both sides 
lacking any inclination whatsoever to seek 
compromise. The parties are not aware of 
any  other  political  mode  than  absolute 
confrontation.  Instead  of  looking  for 
common  ground  in  the  crisis,  the  verbal 
trenches between the governing Socialists 
and the Conservative opposition have only 
grown deeper over the past months. 
 
The  austerity  and  reform  proposals 
forwarded by the leader of the opposition, 
Mariano Rajoy, are along the same lines as 
those  of  the  government.  This  makes  his 
criticism of government, recited over and 
over  like  a  mantra,  all  the  more 
incomprehensible.  A  large  part  of  the 
criticism  has  to  do  with  electoral  tactics. 
The  PP  hopes  that  the  Zapatero 
government, which does not have a stabile 
majority in Parliament, will fall by autumn 
at the latest in its bid to force through the 
new  budget,  thus  making  new  elections 
unavoidable.  It  is  highly  likely  that  this 
would  then  lead  to  a  change  in 
government.  According  to  surveys,  the 
People’s Party is currently in front of the 
governing PSOE. 
 
At  the  same  time,  this  obstructionism  is 
irresponsible.  It  limits  the  latitude  for 
action on the part of the government to an 
unwarranted  degree,  forcing  it  to  provide 
small  regionally-based  partners  a  say  in 
weighty  issues  which  the  future  of  the 
country depends upon.  
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The  tolerance  of  voters  for  the  heated 
party dispute has declined considerably: in 
a survey carried out for the daily El Pais in 
June, 88% of persons surveyed stated “yes” 
in  response  to  the  question  “Should  the 
PSOE  and  PP  attempt  to  come  up  with  a 
compromise pact transcending party lines 
instead of bashing each other?”. The crisis 
of  confidence  in  the  political  elite  is 
dramatic.  86%  of  persons  surveyed  state 
that  they  have  little  or  no  confidence  in 
Mr. Zapatero, the head of government. 73% 
do  not  believe  that  Rajoy  would  do  any 
better, and 77% are of the opinion that in 
general Spain needs different politicians to 
head  the  parties.  The  overwhelming 
majority do not want new elections. In the 
May  survey  of  Centro  de  Investigaciones 
Sociológicas 19% of those surveyed stated 
that  one  of  the  main  problems  in  the 
country is the parties and their leadership. 
 
The figures demonstrate that the Spanish 
political leadership would be well advised 
to close ranks in the crisis. This does not 
have  to  go  so  far  as  the  formation  of  a 
formal  coalition  (although  Socialists  and 
Conservatives in the Basque country show 
that  they  are  also  capable  of  this).  But 
clinging  to  conventional  patterns  of 
confrontational  politics  is  harmful.  It 
narrows  the  latitude  for  action  for  the 
entire country. Increasing disenchantment 
with  democracy  would  be  fatal,  and  this 
not  only  in  the  current  crisis  situation. 
Disillusion  with  politics  and  a  loss  of 
confidence  would  strengthen  the 
nationalists  in  the  regions  –  with 
unpredictable outcomes. 
 
IV 
The third illusion: Europe 
always feels good 
Originally,  the  presidency  of  the  Council 
was supposed to be the culmination of the 
foreign policy of Prime Minister  Zapatero 
and his social reform team. The objectives 
formulated  by  the  government  were 
majestic  and  the  summits  were  to  be 
supposed  to  be  accompanied  by  major 
fanfare  in  this  traditionally  pro-European 
country.  Critics  began  questioning  the 
government early on, however, saying that 
the list of priorities was nothing more than 
a  smorgasbord  of  wishes  and  desires  of 
various ministries, reflecting a lack of any 
real ideas for the future of the integration 
project. 
 
But  things  turned  out  differently  than 
planned. It only became evident late in the 
day  that  the  Spanish  presidency  of  the 
Council would be the first one to have to 
deal with the new set of rules contained in 
the Lisbon Treaty and that it still needed 
to define its own role located somewhere 
between  the  new  office  of  the  permanent 
President of the European Council and the 
new  High  Representative  for  Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. The new team 
was finally set in February 2010. 
 
The  major  strategic  lines  which  the 
rotating presidencies of the Council in the 
past were able to use as orientation were 
no  longer  available  to  the  Spanish 
government  and  its  experienced 
diplomats. After initial attempts to create 
a  real  impetus,  the  Spanish  government 
had  to  content  itself  with  performing  the 
enormous  but  almost  invisible  and  thus 
politically  thankless  administrative  work. 
Foreign  Minister  Moratinos  achieved 
several  diplomatic  highlights  working 
behind the scenes, such as a compromise 
in  the  conflict  between  Switzerland  and 
Libya or further relaxation of the situation 
in  the  Balkans  thanks  to  Spain’s  good 
relations  with  Serbia.  Various  barriers 
along the path to the establishment of the 
European  Foreign  Service  were  also 
surmounted.  The  economic  programme 
Europe  2020  was  adopted  surprisingly 
swiftly under the Spanish aegis. 
 
In  other  areas  there  were  unexpected 
setbacks:  two  planned  summits  were 
cancelled  at  the  start:  one  with  the  U.S. 
and one with the Mediterranean countries. 
President Obama could not be convinced of 
the  benefits  of  a  bilateral  summit.  The  
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meeting with the Mediterranean countries 
was doomed to failure right from the start 
as a result of tensions in the Middle East. 
The  secretariat  of  the  Union  of  the 
Mediterranean  nevertheless  commenced 
its  work  in  March.  Additional  meetings 
such  as  the  EU-Latin  America  summit 
ended with only a few tangible results.  
 
It  was  not  solely  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon 
which made the Spanish presidency of the 
Council  of  secondary  importance.  Spain 
had to endure another painful experience. 
Caught  up  in  the  midst  of  its  own 
economic  crisis,  Spain  was  subjected  to 
excessive  criticism  by  partners,  with  its 
leadership  being  questioned.  The  press 
and political arena especially in Germany 
lavished  ridicule  on  Spain.  The  political 
room for manoeuvre contracted even more 
as  a  result.  Thus,  for  instance,  the 
proposal  of  Zapatero  to  also  consider 
sanctions within the framework of a more 
strongly  coordinated  EU  economic  policy 
right  at  the  outset  of  the  Spanish 
presidency  was  dismissed  with  scarcely 
concealed derision.  
 
The  fact  that  merely  a  few  months  later 
critics were calling for stronger sanctions 
and  the  European  Council  was  officially 
mentioning  such  may  constitute  a  quiet 
victory  for  the  Spanish  government.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  major  contours  have 
been  outlined  in  Berlin  and  Paris,  not  in 
Madrid.  Thus  Spain  is  emerging  from  its 
fourth  presidency  having  learned  that 
Europe can hurt as well. What Spain will 
do as a result of this experience cannot be 
foreseen as of yet. The feeling that it has 
been labelled as a loser and is as a result 
being  excluded  from  the  core  of  the 
decision-making  process  could  well 
continue to grow, however. If that were the 
case,  this  country,  characterised  by  so 
much  euphoria  over  Europe  in  the  past, 
may opt for a different course. This would 
not benefit Spain or the EU, however. 
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